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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between remittances and migrants￿educa-
tion both theoretically and empirically, using original bilateral remittance data.
At a theoretical level we lay out a model of remittances interacting migrants￿
human capital with two dimensions of immigration policy: restrictiveness, and
selectivity. The model predicts that the relationship between remittances and
migrants￿education is ambiguous and depends on the immigration policy con-
ducted at destination. The e⁄ect of education is more likely to be positive
when the immigration policy is more restrictive and less skill-selective. These
predictions are then tested empirically using bilateral remittance and migration
data and proxy measures for the restrictiveness and selectivity of immigration
policies at destination. The results strongly support the theoretical analysis,
suggesting that immigration policies determine the sign and magnitude of the
relationship between remittances and migrants￿education.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between remittances and migrants￿education
both theoretically and empirically, using original bilateral remittances data. This
question is important because the increasingly quality-selective nature of immigration
policies in many traditional destinations (favoring immigration of highly educated
workers and at the same time discouraging immigration of low-skill workers) has
raised concerns in developing countries and among international development agencies
that such policy changes will result in more brain drain and less remittances. These
concerns are based on the tacit view that the highly educated remit less. And indeed,
there are many reasons to expect a negative relationship between remittances and
migrants￿education: more educated migrants often come from richer families and
have a higher propensity to migrate with their entire household (hence, less need to
send remittances) and a lower propensity to return, reducing the incentives to remit
as a way of maintaining prestige and ties to the home community. On the other
hand, better educated migrants have a higher income potential, are less likely to be
illegal and more likely to have bank accounts and access to less costly transfer means.
In addition, their education may have been funded by informal loans from family
members to be repaid with interest in the form of remittances.1 A priori then, it is
not clear theoretically whether the highly skilled will remit more or less on average.
Empirically, the question has been surprisingly understudied.
At a macro level, the only empirical evidence to look at this issue using aggre-
gate data are two recent papers by Faini (2007) and Niimi, Ozden and Schi⁄ (2010).
Faini (2007) shows that migrants￿remittances decrease with the proportion of skilled
individuals among emigrants and concludes: "this result suggests that the negative
impact of the brain drain cannot be counterbalanced by higher remittances". How-
ever, any correlation between remittances and the skill level observed across countries
may be spurious.2 To account for endogeneity issues, Niimi, Ozden and Schi⁄(2010)
instrument the number of emigrants (but treat the proportion of skilled as exogenous)
and obtain similar qualitative results. The macro literature also includes one bilateral
study by Schioupu and Siegfried (2006) who used a bilateral remittances database
recently released by the European Central Bank and found instead a negative corre-
lation between the share of low-skill workers and remittance receipts, suggesting that
in contrast to the results obtained with aggregate data, migrants￿skills tend to raise
remittances.3
1See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on migrants￿
remittances. See also Ashraf et al. (2010) for experimental evidence on ￿nancial education and
remittances.
2For example, if poverty is a constraint to both migration and education, we may ￿nd richer
developing countries being able to send more migrants (yielding more remittances), and that these
migrants also have more schooling.
3Other recent studies of the determinants of remittances using bilateral data include Lueth and
Ruiz-Arranz (2008), de Sousa and Duval (2010), and Frankel (2011). However these studies do not
2At a micro level, Bollard et al. (2011) examine the relationship between remit-
tances and migrants￿education using household survey data on immigrants in eleven
destination countries. They ￿nd a mixed pattern between higher education and the
likelihood of remitting, and a strong positive relationship between higher education
and the amount remitted conditional on remitting. Combining these intensive and
extensive margins gives an overall positive e⁄ect of higher education on the amount
remitted, with an expected amount of $1,000 annually for a migrant with a university
degree against $750 for someone without university degree. In relative terms however,
and for the surveys containing information on income, the less educated tend to remit
a larger share of their income. Bollard et al. (2011) also investigate why the more
educated remit more and ￿nd the higher income earned by migrants, rather than
characteristics of their family situations or their return intentions, explains much of
the higher remittances. It is noteworthy that these results are obtained for the pooled
data and hold for most but not all surveys; for example, they are not supported in
the case of immigrants surveyed as part of the German Socio-Economic Panel, for
which there is a negative (but not signi￿cant) association between remittances and
holding a university degree. And indeed, using di⁄erent waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel, Dustmann and Mestres (2010) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of education on
remittances after controlling for intentions to return and household composition at
destination. Duval and Wol⁄(2011) also use longitudinal survey data on remittances
to Albania and ￿nd remittances decrease with both the migrants and recipients￿level
of education.
This paper makes three contributions in terms of data, theory, and empirics.
The ￿rst contribution is to build in Section 3 a new bilateral remittances database by
merging various sources to capture bilateral remittances from 89 sending to 46 receiv-
ing countries over the period 1985-2005. To the best of our knowledge, the resulting
database is the most comprehensive bilateral remittance data set currently available.
Second, we lay out in Section 2 a simple model of remittance behavior interacting
migrants￿human capital with two dimensions of immigration policies: restrictiveness,
and selectivity. Our model predicts that the microeconomic relationship between the
amount remitted and the migrant￿ s skill level is inverse-U shaped, with the increasing
segment being longer (resp. shorter) for more restrictive (resp. selective) immigration
policies. The main testable implication, therefore, is that for a given country pair,
a more skilled pool of migrants will send more (resp. less) remittances if the desti-
nation country has a more restrictive (resp. selective) immigration policy. Finally,
these predictions are tested in Section 4 using bilateral remittance data and proxy
measures for the restrictiveness and selectivity of immigration policies at destination.
look at the e⁄ect of the skill composition of bilateral migration ￿ ows.
32 Theoretical foundations
In this section, we study the microfoundations of the relationship between aggregate
remittances and the skill composition of migration. We show that the sign and inten-
sity of the relationship depend on the type of immigration policies in the destination
countries.
Our model starts from a tautological decomposition of bilateral remittances into
two additive components: remittances sent by highly skilled migrants (with human
capital hs) and remittances sent by low skilled migrants (with human capital hu).
The aggregate amount of bilateral remittances sent by migrants born in country i
(the recipient country) and living in country j (the transferring country) at time t











ijt stands for the bilateral migration stock of type-k migrants (k equals s for
high-skilled, u for low-skilled, and s + u for total), and T k
ijt represents the amount
remitted per migrant.
To emphasize the e⁄ect of the skill composition of migration on remittances, the



















De￿ning ￿ijt ￿ Ms
ijt=M
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ijt as the proportion of highly skilled in the bilateral
migration stock from i to j, ￿ijt ￿
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ijt as the excess amount remitted
by a highly skilled individual relatively to a low skilled one (which can be positive
or negative), taking logs, and considering a linear approximation given that ￿ijt￿ijt





ijt + ￿ijt￿ijt (1)
If highly skilled migrants remit more than low-skilled migrants (￿ijt > 0), then
the aggregate amount of remittances should increase with migrants￿education level.
If they remit less (￿ijt < 0), then the aggregate amount of remittances decreases
with migrants￿education level.
Equation (1) can therefore serve as a basis for our empirical analysis. Our point
is that ￿ijt needs not be homogeneous across destinations. In particular, its sign and
magnitude depend on the immigration policies conducted in destination countries.
To illustrate this, we endogenize ￿ijt in the next section.
2.1 Determinants of ￿ijt
To understand the determinants of ￿ijt, we study the microfoundations of the remit-
tance behavior and endogenize the amount T k
ijt sent by each migrant. Although the
4data only enable us to distinguish two groups of migrants, we ￿rst abstract from the
bilateral structure of migration (for simplicity, subscripts i, j and t are omitted in
this section) and study the link between a migrant￿ s skill level h ￿ 1 and the amount
transferred.4 The skill price in the destination country is denoted by w￿ whereas the
skill price at origin is denoted by w < w￿. Both are treated as exogenous.
Before we proceed with the model it is important to empasize that the model
below can receive two interpretations that cover the two main motivations to remit
emphasized in the literature: altruism and exchange. The ￿rst of these motives
is more static in nature as it primarily aims at redistributing income among the
members of a given family at a given point in time. The second motive is in essence
more dynamic as remittances motivated by exchange generally aim at maintaining
or developing the migrant￿ s capital at home (be it social or physical) and prepare
his return at a later period. From that second perspective, the model can therefore
be viewed as a dynamic model in which the migrants live for two periods: they
migrate in the ￿rst period and decide which fraction of time ￿ to spend abroad
in the second period. The amount remitted T is then equivalent to accumulating
savings (at unitary return rate) in order to prepare one￿ s return to the home country.
This second interpretation, therefore, treats remittances as savings resulting from an
individual intertemporal choice. Alternatively, the model can also be interpreted as a
static model in which the migrants care about their own utility and the utility of other
family members, a fraction ￿ of whom can be brought with the migrant as dependents.
For simplicity, in the static case, we normalize family size (excluding the migrant) to
unity and assume that transfers are such that all family members￿incomes (including
the migrant and those who stay in the home country) are equalized.
Immigration policies at destination are assumed to be fully characterized by two
parameters. A ￿rst scale parameter, denoted by c; captures the "restrictiveness" of
immigration policy: the higher c, the higher the cost of increasing the fraction of time
￿ (e.g., through obtaining a permanent visa) during which the migrant is able to stay
at destination during the second period; or, in the static model, the higher the cost
of bringing additional family members through family reunion programs. A second
parameter, denoted by a; captures the "selectivity" of immigration policy: the higher
a, the larger the cost advantage for an educated migrant to extend her stay during
the second period or to bring additional family members. Formally, for a migrant of
type h, the utility cost of staying a proportion ￿ of the second period (in the dynamic




The migrant￿ s utility is assumed to be logarithmic in income and must account
for the cost of an extended stay or of bringing additional family members. It can be
4The assumption that h ￿ 1 is reasonably always satis￿ed if h measures, for example, the number
of years of schooling or the number of e¢ ciency units of labor.
5written as:
U(T;￿;h) = ln[w
￿h ￿ T] + ln[￿w
￿h + (1 ￿ ￿)wh + T] ￿
c￿
ha (3)
where the utility cost of ￿ is substracted as an e⁄ort or time cost for mathematical
tractability.
The utility function must be maximized with respect to T and ￿. To highlight the
determinants of remittances, we solve the optimization problem in two steps. We ￿rst
derive the optimal amount of transfer for a given migration type (i.e., for a given ￿).
Then we solve the selection issue and plug the optimal level of ￿ into the remittance
equation. This procedure enables us to disentangle the direct and indirect impacts
of migrants￿education on remittances. Another advantage is that it simpli￿es the
characterization of corner regimes. However, it is worth noticing that a one-step
procedure (i.e., solving a system of two ￿rst-order conditions) would generate exactly
the same results.
Maximizing (3) with respect to T gives:
T
￿(￿;h) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(w￿ ￿ w)h
2
(4)
Clearly, there will be no remittances if ￿ = 1; that is, if migration is permanent
(in the dynamic interpretation of the model) or if the migrant brings with her all the
members of the family (in the static model). For any given ￿ < 1, the amount remitted
is always positive given that w￿ > w and is proportional to the migrant￿ s skill level
h. Micro-level empirical studies, therefore, should ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of migrants￿
skills on remittances after controlling for the location of the family members and for
the expected duration of stay at destination (see Bollard et al., 2011). Such control
variables, however, are not available at the macro level. Besides, the unobserved
propensity to extend one￿ s stay or to bring family members might be endogenous and
vary with the migrants￿human capital.
Substituting T ￿ into the utility function (3) gives the following quasi-indirect
utility function:
V (￿;h) = 2ln
￿










> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if h ￿ h0
2(w￿￿w)ha￿c(w￿+w)
c(w￿￿w) if h 2 [h0;h1]
1 if h ￿ h1
(6)
6The interior solution is obtained by setting V
0 = 0: Since V
00 < 0, it is a maximum.










￿1=a are such that h1 > h0; they are increasing with
the restrictiveness of the immigration policy (c) and are decreasing with the intensity
of skill-selective programs (a). If human capital is very low (h ￿ h0), migrants will
choose to move alone and will be unable to extend their stay beyond the ￿rst period
(￿
￿ = 0). This situation is likely to be observed in destination countries conducting
guest worker programs (e.g., in the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil) where c is very high. If human capital is very high (h ￿ h1), migrants will choose
to bring all their family members with them or move permanently (￿
￿ = 1).
Focusing on the interior solution, the time spent abroad, or the number of spon-
sored relatives (i.e. ￿
￿(h)), increases with the migrant￿ s human capital when the
destination country conducts a selective policy (a > 0) and decrease with the restric-
tiveness of the immigration policy (c). Note that ￿
￿(h) is an increasing and concave
function of h if skill-selection is weak (a < 1) and an increasing and convex function
of h if skill-selection is strong (a > 1). In both cases, highly skilled migrants are
richer but migrate for longer periods or with more family members. The amount
remitted then becomes an ambiguous function of migrant￿ s education. Substituting
￿





> > > > <
> > > > :
T0(h) ￿ (w￿ ￿ w)h
2 if h ￿ h0
T(h) ￿ [cw￿ ￿ (w￿ ￿ w)ha] h
c if h 2 [h0;h1]
T1(h) ￿ 0 if h ￿ h1
(7)
The function T0(h) is linear and increasing in h. The function T(h) is concave in




(1 + a)(w￿ ￿ w)
￿1=a
(8)
which is higher than h0 if and only if a < w￿￿w
w￿+w ￿ b a 2 [0;1].
Figure 1 describes the microeconomic relationship between migrants￿skills (h)
and the optimal amount of remittances, T ￿(h). We only depict the situation where
the interior maximum hm is larger than h0.5 We see that the optimal amount of
remittances T ￿ is ￿rst proportional to the migrant￿ s education level (for h<h0), is
then increasing and concave for intermediate levels of education (between h0 and hm)
5The other case where the maximum hm is lower than h0 is very similar to Figure 1, except that
the linear segment of the transfer curve, T0(h), intersects with the concave part, T(h); at the right
of its maximum attained with h = hm. Remittances increase linearly with education when h < h0
and decrease for higher levels of education. Again, an inverted-U shaped function is obtained.
7and ￿nally decreases with education for higher levels of education (between hm and
h1). An increase in the restrictiveness of immigration policy (a higher c) shifts the
transfer curve outwards, as depicted by the grey dashed line: all the critical values
h0; h1 and hm are increased (this is why they are expressed as functions of c and a).
In contrast, an increase in the selectivity of the immigration policy (a higher a) shifts
the transfer curve inwards, unambiguously reducing h0; h1 and hm and making the








This expression is clearly negative given that h and therefore hm are greater than 1.
Figure 1: Remittances and migrants￿education level
What are the implications for the macroeconomic analysis of remittances and skill
composition of migration? If we have two groups of migrants (the highly skilled with
h = hs, and the low skilled with h = hu < hs), the excess amount remitted by a
highly skilled ￿ ￿ (T s ￿ T u)=T u is given by:
8￿ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <









0 (hu) ? 0 if hu < h0 < hs < h1
T￿(hs)￿T￿(hu)
T￿
0 (hu) ? 0 if h0 < hu < hs < h1
￿1 < 0 if h0 < hu < h1 < hs
0 if h0 < h1 < hu < hs
(9)
In other words, although the microeconomic relationship (1) between remittances
and migrants￿skill level T ￿(h) can be non-monotonic, ￿ can only be positive or
negative when only two groups of workers can be distinguished. However the sign
and magnitude of ￿ depend on the range of the observed skill levels [hu;hs]. If the
maximum of the transfer curve, hm, is such that hs < hm, then ￿ is unambiguously
positive. If hm < hu, then ￿ is unambiguously negative. And if hu < hm < hs, then
￿ can be positive or negative.
In addition, interesting predictions on the role of immigration policies can be
derived from this model. As illustrated on Figure 1, the shape of the transfer curve
depends on the restrictiveness and selectivity of immigration policies at destination.
Hence, the aggregate relationship between remittances and education is likely to vary
with the characteristics of destination countries. More precisely:
￿ The higher the restrictiveness of the immigration policy at destination (c), the
larger the segment on which remittances increase with education. Hence, ￿ is
more likely to be positive. In more restrictive destination countries, aggregate
remittances are more likely to be positively correlated with the immigrants￿
education level.
￿ The higher the selectivity of the immigration policy at destination (a), the
smaller the segment on which remittances increase with education. Hence, ￿ is
more likely to be negative. In more selective countries, aggregate remittances
are more likely to be negatively correlated with the immigrants￿education level.
To test these predictions we need bilateral data on remittances, on the size and
structure of migration, and measures of the restrictiveness and selectivity of immigra-
tion policies. Our empirical strategy will consist in estimating eq. (1) treating ￿ as a
coe¢ cient. Using interactions between our variable of interest (the skill composition
of migration) and regional dummies as well as more direct proxy measures for immi-
gration policies, we will estimate the e⁄ect of immigration policies at destination on
the sign and intensity of ￿.
92.2 Determinants of ￿ijt
In the empirical analysis, migration stocks and compositions will be treated as ex-
ogenous regressors. This may appear as a limitation since migration is clearly an
endogenous process a⁄ected by the same set of determinants as the amount of re-
mittances per migrants. Indeed, the endogeneity of migration is a straightforward
prediction of our model. The optimized utility level at destination V ￿(h), can be
obtained by plugging (7) into (5). The utility of staying at home, on the other hand,
is simply given by V 0(h) = 2ln(wh). Re-introducing bilateral notations (i.e. country
and time subscripts), migration from country i to country j is desirable for type-k









where xijt(c;h) is the migration costs for the household head, which depends on
the restrictiveness of the immigration policy (@xijt=@c > 0) and of its selectivity in
country j (governing @xijt=@h < 0), and ￿ stands for bilateral random terms (as in
Roy, 1951, or Borjas, 1987).
When the random term follows an iid extreme-value distribution, we can apply

















It is obvious that these bilateral migration rates depend on the same determinants
of as the remittances per migrant (i.e., on skill prices and on the parameters that
characterize the immigration policies) and that they vary with the migrants￿level of
education. Consequently, the migration stocks M
s+u
ijt and its skill composition ￿ijt
used in (1) are likely to be correlated with ￿ijt. This reinforces the choice of our
empirical strategy just described in the previous sub-section to allow ￿ to vary with
the restrictiveness and selectivity immigration policies (through interaction terms) at
destination.
3 Data
To examine the relationship between remittances and the skill level of migrants,
we construct a new comprehensive bilateral data set documenting the amount of
remittances sent by transferring country j to recipient country i at time t (denoted
by Rijt), and the size and structure of bilateral migration stocks from origin country
i to destination country j. We denote by Mk
ijt the stock of migrants with education
level k.
103.1 Bilateral migration data
Migration data are taken from Docquier et al. (2010) who construct 195x195 matrices
of bilateral migration stocks for 1990 and 2000. The matrices are computed for two
skill groups: migrants with college (tertiary) education, referred to as high-skill, and
with less than college education (primary and secondary), referred to as low-skill.
The methodology used in Docquier et al. (2010) consists of three steps. The starting
point is the database described in Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) documenting
bilateral migration stock to OECD host countries. It is based on a collection of
census and register immigration data by country of birth and educational level in the
30 OECD countries. The second step consists of a collection of similar immigration
data from 46 non-OECD destinations in 2000 and 31 destinations in 1990. Finally,
data collected in steps 1 and 2 are used to predict the size and structure of migration
to the remaining 119 non-OECD host countries in 2000 (and 134 in 1990). Gravity
regression models were estimated for the size of bilateral migration from country i to
country j in the education group k. The latter constructed data will not be used in
our empirical analysis, which only builds on primary census data.
3.2 Bilateral remittances
The main di¢ culty is to obtain a large database on bilateral remittances. Our data
set combines ￿ve existing databases constructed by other authors or organizations.
3.2.1 Primary sources
We use the following primary sources of data:
￿ The EU database (labeled as database I) is documented in a report of Jimenez-
Martin, Jorgensen and Labeaga (2007) for the European Commission. It pro-
vides yearly bilateral remittances data from 16 EU origin countries6 to 33 des-
tinations7 from 2000 to 2005. The database is unbalanced and includes a total
of 337 observations covering 89 pairs of countries. To construct this database
the authors relied mainly on the National Balance Sheet of Payment Statistics,
the Second EU Survey on worker￿ s remittances from the EU to third countries,
surveys based on micro-level data, and data from various less important sources.
￿ The IMF database (labeled as database II) is documented in the paper by
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), two researchers from the International Mone-
6Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom
7Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Moldova, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Suriname, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, United
States, Venezuela
11tary Fund. It distinguishes 69 remittances sending countries8 and 11 recipient
countries from Asia and Europe (Bangladesh, Croatia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Macedonia, Moldova, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Thailand)9 that break down their remittance receipts by country of origin and
spans the period 1980-2005. The panel is unbalanced and includes a total of
1650 observations covering 200 country pairs. Remittance data (in USD) was
provided by the recipient countries which produce estimates of inward remit-
tances by paying countries using a variety of sources, including the International
Transaction Recording System (ITRS), migrant surveys and statistics, as well
as statements and surveys from banks and money operators. The bilateral
￿ ows captured in this data set account for nearly 90 percent of all remittances
recorded in the balance of payments of these countries.
￿ The Romanian database (labeled as database III) is documented in the paper
by De Sousa and Duval (2010). It provides bilateral remittances data (in USD)
from 17 countries (12 EU countries plus Canada, the United States, Israel,
Turkey and Switzerland) to Romania and covers the period 2005-08. Four
observations per year are provided by the authors. The panel is balanced. The
main source is the National Bank of Romania where data by paying country
have been collected.
￿ The IDB database (labeled as database IV) was built by the International
Development Bank. It provides bilateral remittances data from the United
States to 5 Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Panama) and covers the period 2003-04. The panel
is balanced. The main source is the US balance of payment.
￿ The ECB database (labeled as database V) is documented in the paper by
Schioupu and Siegfried (2006), two researchers from the European Central
Bank. It provides bilateral remittances data from 21 European paying countries
(19 EU countries, plus Norway and Switzerland) and other non EU countries10
8Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Brunei, Canada,
China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Lybia, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan
9Latin American countries have been excluded on purpose by the authors since most of their
remittances originate in the United States, and this corridor has been widely studied by the Inter
American Development Bank. See database IV below.
10Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Congo, Cyprus, Cote d￿ Ivoire,
Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon,
Libya, Lithuania, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi
12to 9 recipient countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Croatia, Macedo-
nia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Russia)11 and covers the period 2000-05.
The panel is unbalanced.
Since each original database (except the IDB one) is unbalanced with respect to
either the year of reference or the list of origins/destinations, we extended them over
time and/or space in order to make them as balanced as possible and compatible
with each other. The procedure consists in three steps:
3.2.2 Creation of missing triplets and censoring
We refer to a data point containing information on remittances from a given origin
to a given source at a given year as a "triplet". Four out of ￿ve of the remittances
databases to be merged are unbalanced with respect to at least one of these three
dimensions. We create the missing triplets starting ￿rst by constructing the missing
origin/destination country pairs and then by plugging the corresponding reference
years. Once the missing triplets have been created in each original remittances data
set, their remittances value has been censored to zero.12 Our guiding assumptions
here is that the authors of the original data sets did not report data points that were
below a certain critical value (unknown to us). In other terms we assumed that the
amount of money transferred was negligible, that is, almost equal to zero for the
missing pairs of countries. There are two situations in which missing values have
not been censored. First, for missing values belonging to a triplet already present in
another data set for which a positive value of remittances is available, and second
when the missing value of remittances belongs to a triplet which is situated between
two time-speci￿c triplets for which positive values of remittances are available. In
the ￿rst case, the same amount of remittances has been transferred over the same
triplet from one data set to another. While in the second case, the mean of the two
positive observed values belonging to the previous and the following triplet has been
estimated to replace the missing one.13
As far as the EU database is concerned, missing couples have been created ex-
panding the list of remittances receiving countries up to the full sample of 44 countries
obtained after the aggregation of the 5 databases. The new couples created refer to
Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, South Korea, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
States, Yemen
11For these countries the data come from their national central banks, except for Morocco where
they come from the O¢ ce des Changes.
12The EU database has the highest percentage (89%) of created zeroes, followed by IMF (66%),
Romania (62%) and ECB (61%).
13We only interpolated four cells in the EU database. For each of the following triplets, Brazil
Spain 2002, Ecuador Spain 2002, Peru Spain 2002 and United States Spain 2002, we did not cen-
sored the missing remittances value to zero but we computed the mean value between the observed
remittances in year 2001 and 2003.
13the same period of time belonging to the balance of payment or to the surveys used
by the transferring country.14
For the IMF data set, missing couples have been generated expanding the list of
paying countries up to the full sample of 89 countries obtained after the aggregation
of the 5 databases. The new couples created refer to the same length of time of the
balance of payment used by the receiving country.15 For the Romanian database,
missing observations for the year 2005 have been created by expanding the list of
paying countries up to the full sample of 89 countries obtained after the aggregation
of the 5 databases. For the IDB data set we did not add any empty cells since the data
set is balanced from the beginning. Finally, for the ECB data set, missing couples
have been created expanding the list of paying countries up to the full sample of 89
countries obtained after the aggregation of the 5 databases and refer to the same
period of time considered by the data source.16
3.2.3 Merging the ￿ve data sets
The aggregation17 of these di⁄erent sources gives an unbalanced database document-
ing bilateral transfers from 89 countries to 46 recipient countries. There are 13865
observations (2772 observations, 4 interpolated values and 11089 constructed zeroes)
for 1969 origin-destination country pairs.
The sending countries are: Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon,
Canada, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Guinea, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Moldova,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
14Belgium from 2002-2004, Cyprus from 2002-2005, France from 2002-2005, Germany from 2000-
2005, Greece from 2000-2005, Hungary from 2000-2005, Ireland 2002-2005, Italy 2000-2005, Latvia
2000-2005, Lithuania 2000-2005, Netherlands 2000-2005, Poland for 2004, Portugal 2000-2005, Slove-
nia 2004-2005, Spain 2001-2005, United Kingdom 2004-2005
15Bangladesh from 1985-2005, Croatia from 1997-2005, Indonesia from 2003-2005, Kazakhstan
from 2003-2005, Macedonia from 1997-2005, Moldova from 2003-2005, Philippines from 1985-2004,
Serbia from 2000-2005, Slovenia from 1994-2004, Tajikistan from 2002-2005 and Thailand from
1993-2004
16Algeria for 2003-2004, Egypt for 2001-2003, Morocco for 2000-2003, Tunisia for 2001-2003,
Croatia for 2000-2004, Macedonia for 2003-2004, Serbia and Montenegro for 2004, Romania for
2005 and Russia for 2004
17There are 875 double triplets in the new aggregated remittances￿ dataset. In case a speci￿c
triplet (origin, destination and year) appears with positive values in two di⁄erent original datasets
we proceed in this way. We keep it since the correlation within each double is very high and perform
the estimations with and without doubles using dummies in order to control for it. As expected,
results are robust to the di⁄erent speci￿cations.
14Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Singa-
pore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Taiwan Province of China, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
The recipient countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Moldova, Morocco, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovenia, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, United States,
Venezuela.
3.2.4 Couples for which migration data are missing
For many immigration countries in the remittance database, Docquier et al (2010)
have collected census data on the size and structure of migration. A ￿rst problem
is that migration data are only available for 1990 and 2000, while remittances data
goes from 1985 to 2005. In the aggregate database, we will use the 1990 migration
structure for the years 1985-1995, and the 2000 structure for the years 1996-2005.
This should not distort too much our empirical analysis since migration data are
based on sluggish migration stocks (not migration ￿ ows).
Another problem is that the migration database only documents the structure of
immigration of 52 destination countries out of the 89 destinations in remittances data-
base. For the remittances data to be consistent with the migration data, the number
of migration destinations (remittances sending countries) is limited to 52 countries
while the sample of migration origins does not change (i.e. 46 countries18).19 For
example, in the migration data set we deal with, countries such as China, Russia or
Tunisia are not contained into the destinations￿sample. So even though remittances
data from these destinations are available (such as remittances data from China to
Algeria, or from Russia to Croatia, or Tunisia to Senegal), these couples cannot be
considered and have therefore been excluded. Hence, the intersection of the above
remittances and the migration databases gives rise to a data set going from 1985
18Among the ￿nal sample of origin countries there are 44 developing countries and 2 developed
ones. The developed countries are Israel and United States.
19The ￿nal list of 52 remittances sending countries is: Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Bel-
gium, Canada, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Oman, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States. The World Bank has recently published a comprehensive dataset on remittances and migra-
tion. For a list of the most important sending countries in a macro setting see World Bank (2011),
pp. 15-16
15to 2005 in which 8928 observations for 1348 country pairs are available.20 As far
as remittances data are concerned, Table 1 shows that the 8928 ￿nal observations
include 4 interpolated values, 6569 imputed zeroes and 2355 observed positive val-
ues. Discriminating by data set, the EU database contains 3058 ￿nal observations,
328 positive observed values, 2726 imputed zeroes and 4 interpolated values (2730
missing triplets). The IMF data set contains 4834 ￿nal observations, 1620 positive
observed values, 3214 imputed zeroes (3214 missing triplets) and 196 true zeroes.21
The Romanian data set contains 45 ￿nal observations, 17 positive observed values,
28 imputed zeroes (28 missing triplets). The IDB database keeps 10 ￿nal observa-
tions. The ECB data set has 981 ￿nal observations, 380 positive observed values, 601
imputed zeroes (601 missing triplets).
Table 1: Composition of the ￿nal database
Final Database EU IMF Romanian IDB ECB
Total observations 8928 3058 4834 45 10 981
Interpolated values 4 4 - - - -
Imputed zeroes 6569 2726 3214 28 - 601
Observed positive values 2355 328 1620 17 10 380
3.2.5 Some descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics concerning the two main variables of in-
terest. The ￿rst set of data (top of the table) concern the average amount of remit-
tances per migrant. We divide the amount of bilateral remittances obtained from the
combined database, by the number of bilateral migrants obtained from the Docquier-
Lowell-Marfouk￿ s database. As the migration population in the latter data set is
restricted to individuals aged 25+, our descriptive statistics overestimate the actual
amount per migrants. Database ￿xed e⁄ects used in the regressions will address this
problem. The second set of data (bottom of the table) reports the skill-ratio in bilat-
eral migration, measured as the ratio of college graduates to less educated migrants.
For each variable, we considered low and high-income destinations as well as di⁄erent
group of countries.
The average level of remittances per migrant is 1,023 USD. Nevertheless, the
dispersion of per remittances per migrant is very high, depending on the level of
development, geographic and immigration policy of destination countries. The mean
20As far as the timing issue is concerned, we use the yearly observations for remittances for the
whole period covered (1985-2005). For migration, we have only two observations per country pair:
1990 and 2000. Given the persistence in the migration data we assume that migration in 1990 is
a good approximation for real migration stocks from 1985 to 1995 and that migration in 2000 is a
good approximation for real migration stocks from 1995 to 2005.
21The IMF database is the only dataset which contains true observed zeroes. Examples of triplets
whose observed values are true zero are: China Latvia 2003, Philippines Denmark 2000, Thailand
United Arab Emirates 1998.
16level of skill ratio is equal to 0.51 with higher level if high-income and point-system
destination countries.
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Remittances per migrant 25+
Full dataset 6,822 1,023 4,108
Low-income destinations 190 26 206
High-income destinations 6,632 1,051 4,163
EU destinations 3,571 911 3,645
GCC destinations 620 1,732 3,824
Western o⁄-shoots destinations 475 654 1,324
Point-system destinations 351 336 885
Skill ratio in bilateral migration 25+
Full dataset 8,834 0.51 0.88
Low income destinations 556 0.10 0.25
High Income destinations 8,278 0.54 0.90
EU destinations 3,755 0.47 0.49
GCC destinations 704 0.20 0.13
Western o⁄-shoots destinations 476 1.91 1.47
Point-system destinations 352 1.86 1.36
3.3 Other data
We use bilateral data on distance, geographical contiguity, colonial links, linguistic
links. Those variables are time-invariant and come from the CEPII data which is
based on population-weighted bilateral distances between the biggest cities at origin
and destination (see Clair et al., 2004). Proxies capturing immigration policies will
be explained in Section 4.4.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Related Literature
The empirical speci￿cation adopted in this paper consists in a gravity model already
used by Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) where the educational level of the migrants,
as in Schioupu and Siegfried (2006), is introduced. In Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008),
one basic and two extended gravity models are estimated. The logarithmic trans-
formation of the total amount of bilateral remittances (expressed in US dollars) is
￿rst regressed over the total and per capita gross domestic product at origin and
destination plus a vector of bilateral variables such as the physical and linguistic dis-
tances between the two countries. In a ￿rst extension, the log of the bilateral stock
of migrants is introduced as additional regressor and, ￿nally, in a second extension,
the log of the imports and exports, the stock market return and in￿ ation di⁄eren-
tials, depreciation of the home versus host country currency, various home and host
17country characteristics, and time ￿xed e⁄ects. The authors estimate the basic and
the ￿rst extension of the above model accounting for origin and destination coun-
try (and region) ￿xed e⁄ects (leaving aside unobserved bilateral characteristics) and
then country pair random e⁄ects (leaving aside origin and destination features). The
second extension has been instead estimated with POLS. The authors ￿nd that the
gravity equation is very powerful in explaining remittance ￿ ows. Indeed, in the base
model, the standard gravity factors alone can explain more than half of the varia-
tion in bilateral remittance ￿ ows. As expected the size of the origin and destination
countries positively a⁄ect the size of remittances, and distance has a negative e⁄ect.
Contiguity has a negative or non signi￿cant e⁄ect, suggesting that sharing a border
may facilitate non o¢ cial transfers. Language has a positive sign suggesting that
cultural a¢ nities matter and, ￿nally, more remittances are sent from countries with
high GDP per capita to low income countries. Once the stock of migrants is added
in the ￿rst extension, the authors ￿nd that the additional regressor is very signi￿cant
and, as expected, positive. Finally, beyond the standard gravity factors, the authors
￿nd a number of variables to be signi￿cant in explaining remittances ￿ ows. Trade has
a positive impact and, in particular, more remittances are sent from destinations of
the home country￿ s exports. Higher in￿ ation in the home country is found to encour-
age more remittance ￿ ows, probably to compensate for the loss of purchasing power.
The regression results also con￿rm that receiving countries￿￿nancial development
and political stability matter.22
In Schioupu and Siegfried (2006), the log of bilateral remittances per migrant (ob-
tained by dividing the log of total remittances by the migrant stock) is regressed over
a vector of bilateral variables such as the di⁄erential rate of return on ￿nancial as-
sets, income di⁄erentials (ratio of GDP per capita), and bilateral migration. Besides,
another vector contains origin variables such as the skill level of the migrants (data
are from OECD), income inequality, remittance costs, uno¢ cial economic activity.
Country of destination and time ￿xed e⁄ects are included. The authors ￿nd that
GDP per capita di⁄erentials between sending and receiving countries is positively
correlated with the average remittance per migrant. By contrast, interest rate di⁄er-
entials are not signi￿cant. A large informal economy in the paying country depresses
o¢ cial remittance ￿ ows. Finally and most importantly from our perspective, they
￿nd that the share of low-skill workers among migrants leads to lower remittances,
suggesting that higher migrants￿ skill levels contribute to raise remittances.
22See also Yang (2008) on exchange rates ￿ uctuations as a source of exogenous variation in house-
hold income from remittances, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) for a deeper analysis on the re-
lationship between remittances and ￿nancial development using aggregate data, and Freund and
Spatafora (2008) for an analysis of the determinants of formal v. informal remittances.
184.2 Basic speci￿cation
The basic regression model follows eq. (1). We have no empirical counterpart for
lnT u
ijt, the log of transfer per low-skilled migrant. We will introduce di⁄erent sets of
￿xed e⁄ects and potential bilateral correlates (geographic distance, linguistic proxim-
ity) to capture it. In addition, we use the bilateral skill ratio in the migrant population
aged 25+, measured as the ratio of college graduates to less educated migrants plus
one,23 as a proxy for ￿ijt.24 Our empirical model writes as follows:
lnRijdt = ￿i + ￿j + ￿d + ￿t + ￿0 + ￿1 lnM
s+u
ijt + ￿2Sijt
+￿3 lnDij + ￿4Lij + ￿5Yit + ￿6Yjt + ￿ijt (10)
where lnRijdt measures total remittances in US dollars in logs from transferring (i.e.
immigration) country j to recipient (i.e. emigration) country i at time t in data set
d, lnM
s+u
ijt is the log of the bilateral migration stock from i to j and Sijt is the skill-
ratio, and lnDij and Lij are two bilateral variables accounting for geographical and
linguistic distances. Origin, destination, time and database ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
We also control for nominal GDP at origin and destination (Yit and Yjt). The main
coe¢ cient of interest ￿2 will inform us about the average level of ￿ijt.
The estimation of the equation (10) entails various econometric issues25 that may
lead the OLS estimation to generate inconsistent estimates. Moreover, there is a
large proportion of zeros for the dependent variable (bilateral remittances) due to the
fact that we constructed our comprehensive database on remittances to make it as
balanced as possible, as extensively discussed in Section 3.
If OLS were to be used with the size of bilateral remittances as dependent variable,
the estimates are likely to be inconsistent. One alternative is to use the natural log of
bilateral remittances. However, the zero observations are dropped from the sample in
such speci￿cations since the natural log of zero is unde￿ned. In that case, the results
23In line with Grogger and Hanson (2011).
24We are unable, however, to use a variable capturing the vintage of the migration stock. The
only dataset we are aware of where such information partly exists is Beine et al. (2007). In that
data set, the authors provide data on the fraction of skilled migrants arrived before ages 12, 18 and
21. This is not enough to compute the age of the stock (as there is no information on the age of the
individuals at the time of the census) and, moreover, the data by age of entry is available for skilled
workers only.
25Among others, there can be an endogeneity issue due to the relationship between remittances
and migration. In the micro literature the presence of an implicit family loan arrangement can lead to
circular family migration due to remittances (see Poirine, B. (1997): A Theory of Remittances as an
Implicit Family Loan Arrangement, World Development, Vol. 25, N.4, 589-611) and this can presume
that migration decision is endogenous. The empirical micro literature addressed such a reverse
causality issue with instrumental variables￿technique (see for example Bollard, A., D. McKenzie,
M. Morten and H. Rapoport (2011): Remittances and the Brain Drain Revisited: The Microdata
Show that More Educated Migrants Remit More, World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming). On
the macro side, instead, the issue is a bit more di¢ cult to address and this is due to the lower
probability of ￿nding an appropriate instrument. Indeed, nobody dealt with it untill now.
19are likely to be biased and the impacts of the explanatory variables are likely to be
underestimated due to the exclusion of low value observations from the sample and
the selection issue we addressed with the triplets reconstruction and censoring. Al-
ternatively, one can add one to the size of bilateral remittances and then take the log.
However, since the log of one is zero, this results in an excessive number of zeros in the
estimated dependent variable, which also leads to heteroskedasticity in the estimation.
The most appropriate solution to this problem is to use Poisson regression models
that rely on pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates, as argued by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006).26 Accordingly, we implement Poisson regressions as our preferred
speci￿cation. All the Poisson models are estimated with robust standard errors to mil-
itate against a further econometric complication: this relates to the fact that Poisson
maximum likelihood estimation yields consistent point estimates even when the count
is not strictly Poisson distributed (i.e., in case of overdispersion). Importantly in such
circumstances, the estimated standard errors will be signi￿cantly smaller than if the
count was strictly Poisson. This occurs when the conditional variance is greater than
the conditional mean, that is, when the assumption of equidispersion is violated.
Table 3 provides estimation results for the base model in the full sample. Three
di⁄erent estimators are used.27 The ￿rst column provides OLS results when the de-
pendent variable is expressed in log. The second column still provides OLS estimates
but when the dependent variable is expressed as one plus the amount of bilateral
remittances. This transformation allows us to keep the cases in which the level of re-
mittances is equal to zero. Then the third and the fourth columns report estimates28
obtained with the Poisson estimator. Looking at the third column, as expected, the
stock of migrants at destination is positive and signi￿cant, as well as the skill ratio
(of skilled to unskilled migrants at destination).29 Additionally, geographical dis-
tance is negative and linguistic proximity is positive, as in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz
(2008), con￿rming the validity of gravity factors. As far as nominal GDP variables
26For example, they show that the log linearization of gravity models leads to inconsistent esti-
mates of the coe¢ cients of explanatory variables such as distance.
27From Table 4 onwards, only Poisson regressions are performed.
28Like any other regression coe¢ cient, a Poisson regression coe¢ cient represents the change in
response corresponding to a one unit di⁄erence in the corresponding predictor. The Poisson regres-
sion coe¢ cients have to interpreted as follows: for a one unit change in the predictor variable, the
di⁄erence in the logs of expected counts is expected to change by the respective regression coe¢ cient,
given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. If a dummy variable is present,
the coe¢ cient is equal to the di⁄erence in the logs of expected counts between the dummy variable
itself and the base term, while holding the other variables constant in the model.
29In order to exclude the possibilty that remittances sent back from skilled people residing in the
two developed countries (Israel and United States) contained in the ￿nal database include also the
so called ￿ compensations of employees￿ , we have performed the same estimations excluding these
countries from the sample. As in the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (BOPSY),
compensations of employees comprise wages, salaries, and other bene￿ts earned by individuals in
economies other than those in which they are residents, for work performed for and paid for by
residents of those economies. Results are robust to the exclusion of the above origin countries and
available on request.
20are concerned, and again similarly to the results in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008),
the positive sign for the level of GDP at both origin and destination con￿rms that
larger countries receive (and send) larger volumes of remittances in dollar terms.
Table 3. Basic model estimations in the full sample
OLS OLS Poisson
ln(Rijdt) ln(1+Rijdt) Rijdt
Log of migrants￿ stock 0.288 *** 1.090 *** 0.832 ***
0.026 0.026 0.027
Log of distance 0.016 -0.003 -0.030 *
0.012 0.023 0.015
Common language 1.134 *** 0.079 0.774 ***
0.142 0.333 0.134
Skill-ratio 0.003 *** 0.002 ** 0.006 ***
0.000 0.001 0.001
GDP origin (log) -1.153 -1.515 1.398 *
0.760 1.238 0.771
GDP destination (log) 1.272 *** 2.142 *** 1.626 ***
0.274 0.364 0.305
Constant 24.860 6.776 -44.760 **
17.110 27.380 17.210
Origin FE yes yes yes
Dest FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Database FE yes yes yes
Nb of observations 2163 8888 8888
Log pseudolikelihood - - -4.43E+10
F-stat/Wald chi2 47.46 486.77 152663.4
R2 0.742 0.4857 0.9125
Hettest p-value 0 0 0
* Signi￿cant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Robust standard errors below the estimates
Table 4 provides Poisson estimates by data set (the numbering of the columns cor-
responds to the numbering of the data sets in Section 3).30 The stock of migrants is
always positive and highly signi￿cant. Geographical distance is always negative and
signi￿cant, and linguistic proximity matters for the data sets with enough hetero-
geneity in this respect. Regarding our main coe¢ cient of interest, estimation results
are not stable across data sets: a higher skill ratio is positive and weakly signi￿cant
in column I for the EU data set, not signi￿cant in column II for the IMF data set
and negative and signi￿cant in column V for the ECB data set.31
In the following sections, therefore, we investigate whether di⁄erences in the re-
sults across data sets may be explained by di⁄erences in the composition of their
samples of destination countries. More precisely, using insights from our theoretical
30Estimation results concerning database III and IV are not reported because of sample size. The
former contains 45 observations while the latter just 10.
31Evidently, the fact that our estimation results are di⁄erent from Schioupu and Siegfried (2006)
depend on many factors. First of all, the samples of interest are di⁄erent after the creation of
imputed zeroes. In their case, there are 239 observations against 981 in our case. We use Poisson
estimator to account for such a large portion of zeroes while they estimate their model with an
unbalanced panel estimator.
21model, we ask whether the dimensions of ￿ restrictiveness￿and ￿ selectivity￿of immi-
gration policies in the di⁄erent destinations can explain the sign and intensity of the
relationship between remittances and migrants￿education. Given the fact that there
is currently no comparative bilateral data set on immigration policies, nor is there a
synthetic or aggregate index of immigration policy restrictiveness or selectivity, we
have rely on proxy measures for these dimensions (see the discussions in section 4.3.1).
To the extent that di⁄erent regions have di⁄erent immigration policy traditions, we
￿rst use regional membership as a proxy for immigration policy in section 4.3.2 before
turning to more speci￿c aspects of immigration law and policy in section 4.3.3.
Table 4. Basic model Poisson estimations by data set
Dependent: Rijdt I (EU) II (IMF) III (Rom) IV (IDB) V (ECB)
Log of migrants￿ stock 0.790 *** 0.790 *** - - 0.478 ***
0.068 0.035 0.061
Log of distance -0.224 *** -0.086 *** - - -0.154 ***
0.032 0.020 0.035
Common language 1.808 *** 1.388 *** - - 0.652 **
0.295 0.169 0.332
Skill-ratio 0.006 *** -0.177 ** - - -0.674
0.001 *** 0.104 0.474
GDP origin (log) 0.784 1.185 - - 1.793
2.398 0.733 7.710
GDP destination (log) -4.893 ** 1.612 *** - - 3.231 **
2.124 0.322 1.611
Constant 44.665 -37.506 - - -64.894
54.451 19.004 186.32
Origin FE yes yes - - yes
Dest FE yes yes - - yes
Year FE yes yes - - yes
Nb of observations 3058 4794 45 10 981
Log pseudolikelihood -1.30E+09 -2.95E+10 - - -3.67E+09
Wald chi2 232882 992407 - - 9.32E+10
R2 0.884 0.920 - - 0.927
* Signi￿cant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Robust standard errors below the estimates
4.3 Speci￿cations with interactions
4.3.1 Proxying for the dimensions of immigration policy
Unfortunately, there is currently no decent comparative database on immigration
policy as there are no comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable data on immi-
gration laws and policies and no established method for classifying, measuring, and
comparing laws and policies across countries and over time. As a consequence, it
is extremely di¢ cult for scholars to examine the causes and e⁄ects of di⁄erent ap-
proaches to managing immigration. And still, we know that governments adopt a
wide variety of approaches to regulating immigration. They give di⁄erent meanings
to basic concepts such as citizenship and residency, adopt di⁄erent criteria for grant-
ing asylum and refugee status, and place di⁄erent weights on occupational skills,
family reuni￿cation, and cultural and ethnic diversity when selecting immigrants.
22Of course, there have been attempts to provide indicators of restrictiveness of
international migration. These include among others Ortega and Peri (2009), Mayda
(2010) and Belot and Ederveen (2011). From our perspective, however, all those
indicators su⁄er however from a number of drawbacks. For instance, indicators based
on policy reforms, such as those provided by Mayda (2010) are not comparable across
countries: countries can relax their immigration restrictions and at the same time
remain very restrictive compared to other potential destinations. Another issue is
that one country might be very restrictive in one particular area of immigration policy
while being quite liberal in another one. For instance the US has been traditionally
quite liberal in attracting students and skilled workers and quite open in terms of
family reuni￿cation while implementing increasingly tougher regulations on illegal
immigration. Likewise, countries in Continental Europe are considered very generous
in terms of family reuni￿cation while being very restrictive with respect to skilled
and unskilled migrants. Finally, general indicators of entry restriction that aggregate
immigration policies in di⁄erent areas such as the indicator of Ortega and Peri (2009)
tend to overlook the heterogeneity of migration policies within a given country.
There is now an important empirical literature exploring the determinants (push
and pull factors) of the size and skill composition (selection) of international migra-
tion. This literature has notably emphasized the role of wage di⁄erentials (Grog-
ger and Hanson, 2011), credit constraints (Belot and Hatton, 2011) and migra-
tion/diaspora networks (see McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) for a micro study on
Mexico and Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) for a bilateral setting). A common
limit to the papers in this literature, however, is that they either neglect the role of
immigration policies or capture them through proxy variables such as the number
of asylum seekers or the existence of bilateral agreements (e.g., EU membership, ex-
istence of visa waiver or of guest worker programs) between sending and receiving
countries. Hence, this literature uses both bilateral variables (such as the existence
of guest worker programs) and general policy orientations (such as the openness to
refugees) as indicators of immigration policies at destination. We use a similar ap-
proach in section 4.3.3 where we proxy for the restrictiveness of immigration policy
in the destination country using three proxy variables (existence of bilateral guest
worker programs, proportion of refugees among migrants, and proportion of females
among migrants ￿the latter being interpreted as an indicator of openness to family
migration) and for its selectivity by the existence of a point-system. Noting that
immigration policies also have a strong regional character (e.g., the EU is known
to be less selective than the United States, Australia or Canada, and the member
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council all encourage temporary labor migration
through guest-worker programs but discourage permanent family migration through
very stringent citizenship laws and family reunion criteria), in section 4.3.2 we use
also use regional dummies as a proxy measure for the restrictiveness and/or selectivity
of immigration policies.
234.3.2 Interactions with regional dummies
We distinguish ￿ve groups of destination countries (r = 1;:::;5): Persian Gulf coun-
tries (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), EU-
15 (the ￿fteen members of the European Union in 2000), Western o⁄shoots (USA,
Canada, Australia and New-Zealand), and either developing or rich country status
for the remaining countries (using the World Bank classi￿cation). Based on a sub-
stantial literature,32 our assessment is as follows. First, as is well-known, the member
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) favor temporary guest worker mi-
gration and are extremely reluctant to grant permanent status to migrant workers:
we thus characterize these countries as being extremely restrictive and, therefore,
expect a positive coe¢ cient for the interaction between migrants￿skill-ratio and the
￿ Gulf￿dummy. Second, Europe is known for being relatively generous in terms of
family reunion programs (low restrictiveness) while the non-European Anglo-Saxon
countries (especially Canada, Australia and New-Zealand) are more skill-selective: we
therefore expect a negative interaction term for both Europe (due to low restrictness)
and the Western o⁄shoots (due to high-selectivity). Finally, developing countries may
be characterized as neither restrictive nor selective, two features that substitute one
another in predicting the e⁄ect of migrants￿education on remittances.
Table 5 provides regressions results introducing interactions with regional dum-
mies (using the complete set of ￿xed e⁄ects)33 All coe¢ cients on the interaction
terms are in accordance to expectations. In particular the coe¢ cient on the skill-ratio
is positive and highly signi￿cant. Given that it is quite small, the sign and magni-
tude of the total e⁄ect of the skill ratio on remittances from di⁄erent regions are
fully determined by the interaction terms: largely positive in the Gulf countries, and
largely negative in Europe and in the Western o⁄shoots. Each interaction with geo-
graphic dummies can be interpreted in terms of marginal e⁄ect brought to the skill
ratio by the nature of immigration policies at destination. In particular, the immi-
gration policies conducted in the Gulf Countries make the skill ratio more e⁄ective
at increasing remittances, while those conducted in European countries as well as in
the Western o⁄shoots act to reduce the amount of remittances sent home by skilled
migrants. The interaction e⁄ect can be calculated as a double di⁄erence or the dou-
ble derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the two components of the
interaction. Calculations considering the Poisson coe¢ cients for the variables GCC,
EU, Western o⁄shoots and Developing alone give the following marginal e⁄ects. The
32See for example Pritchett (2006) for a typology of immigration policies and characterization of
these policies across regions.
33In order to control for the entire set of ￿xed e⁄ects we followed Santos Silva ans Tenreyro
(2010). Step 1. For the observations with Rijdt > 0 , estimate the ordinary least squares regression
of ln(Rijdt) on xi. Step 2. Construct a subset of explanatory variables, say ~ xi. comprising only
the regressors whose coe¢ cients were estimated in Step 1. Step 3. Using the full sample, run the
Poisson regression of Rijdt on ~ xi. We excluded distance as regressor because it was not signi￿cant
in the ￿rst step.
24net marginal e⁄ect of "Gulf Countries" on remittances equals to 0:027 and to ￿0;29
and ￿0;09 respectively for European countries and for the Western o⁄shoots. The
Poisson regression coe¢ cients represent the change in response corresponding to a
one unit di⁄erence in the corresponding predictor.
Table 5. Poisson regressions with regional interactions terms
Dependent: Rijdt Full sample
Log of migrants￿ stock 0.824 ***
0.029
Skill-ratio (SR) 0.005 ***
0.0001
SR X GCC 0.022 ***
0.003
SR X EU -0.3 ***
0.03
SR X Western o⁄shoots -0.095 ***
0.004
SR X developing -0.001
0.015
Common Language 0.744 ***
0.134
GDP origin (log) 0.265 **
0.806












* Signi￿cant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Robust standard errors below the estimates
4.3.3 Interactions with policy measures
The results in Table 5 support our conjecture that the e⁄ect of migrants￿educa-
tion should vary by destination to the extent that these destinations di⁄er in terms
of immigration policies. To reinforce our conclusions, we explore other interactions
with proxy measures of various dimensions of immigration policies. The extended
regression equation now writes as:
Rijdt = ￿i + ￿j + ￿d + ￿t + ￿0 + ￿1 lnMijt + ￿2Sijt + ￿4 lnDij
+￿4Lij + ￿5Yit + ￿6Yjt +
X
p ￿pSijt￿ijp + ￿ijt (11)
where ￿ijp is a set of variables capturing a dimension p of the immigration policy for
the pair of countries i and j (sometimes only related to the immigration policy in the
destination country j). Table 6 gives the regressions results with such interactions.
25As explained in section 4.3.1, due to lack of data we use proxies for the existence
of temporary labor programs, strict entry policies, skill-biased restrictions, and family
reuni￿cation programs.
The ￿rst policy measure we introduce is a bilateral dummy for the existence after
1990 of a guest worker program in destination country j vis-￿-vis origin country i
(Guest). This is a bilateral variable proxying for the cost of migrating permanently.
Data on the existence of guest workers programs have been gathered using various
sources, notably Basok (2000), Martin (2003), McDowell (2003), and Ruhs and Martin
(2008). As can be seen from Column 1 in Table 6, the skill-ratio among migrants
has a positive and highly signi￿cant e⁄ect on remittances when countries have guest-
worker agreements. Our estimate of the marginal e⁄ect of guest-worker agreements
on the propensity to send remittances by skilled people is equal to 0:295:
The second immigration policy measure we introduce is the average proportion
of refugees at destination (Refugees), calculated as the number of refugees at des-
tination as a percentage of total international migration per year. Data are from
UNHCR Statistical On line Population Database. In line with the literature on the
determinants of international migration in a bilateral setting (Grogger and Hanson,
2011, Belot and Hatton, 2011, Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011, Ortega and Peri,
2009), we interpret ￿ taking many refugees￿as a sign of low restrictiveness. As can be
seen from Column 2 in Table 6, the interaction between the skill-ratio and the share
of refugees among migrants is indeed negative, not enough though to dominate the
positive direct e⁄ect of the skill-ratio on remittances. Our estimate of the marginal
e⁄ect of a low restrictiveness policy on the propensity to send remittances by skilled
people is equal to 0:042.
The third aspect of immigration policy we want to introduce is the ease of family
reunion, for which we use as proxy the share of females among immigrants (Family).
We compute the absolute value of the di⁄erence between the proportion of females
among migrants and one half. If the di⁄erence is small, we interpret this as pointing
to the existence of relatively open and generous family reunion programs (i.e., low
restrictiveness).34 The data are taken from Docquier et al. (2010). As can be seen
from Column 3 in Table 6, the e⁄ect is positive, as expected (i.e., more restrictive
destinations are associated with skilled migrants sending relatively more remittances).
The marginal e⁄ect of costly family reunion immigration policies on the propensity
to send remittances by skilled people is estimated to be equal to 0:267.
Finally, Column 4 in Table 6 reports estimation results using a Point System
interaction term: the skill composition of immigrants at destination is interacted
with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the destination country (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand) has a Point System.35 As expected, the sign of the coe¢ cient of the
34See Morrison, Schi⁄ and Sjoblom (2008).
35Since 1984, Australia￿ s immigration policy has o¢ cially privileged skilled workers, with the
candidates being selected according to their prospective ￿ contribution to the Australian economy￿ .
Canadian immigration policy follows similar lines, resulting in an increasing share of highly educated
26interaction term is negative and highly signi￿cant. Our estimate of the marginal
e⁄ect of skill biased immigration policies on the propensity to send remittances is
equal to 0:79.
Table 6. Poisson regressions with political interactions terms
Dependent: Rijdt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of mig. stock 0.815 *** 0.813 *** 0.812 *** 0.814 ***
0.028 0.027 0.028 0.027
Skill-ratio (SR) 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Guest 0.058 - - -
0.211
SR X Guest 0.295 *** - - -
0.060
SR X Refugees - -3e-005 ** - -
1.8e-005
SR X FamilyCost - - 0.267 *** -
0.074
SR X Point-syst - - - -0.8 ***
0.206
GDP origin (log) 1.705 ** 1.703 ** 1.701 ** 1.69 **
0.77 0.772 0.771 0.776
GDP destination (log) 1.544 *** 1.541 *** 1.54 *** 1.539 ***
0.303 0.301 0.302 0.299
Log of distance -0.028 * -0.027 * -0.023 * -0.0284 *
0.016 0.016 0.057 0.015
Common Language 0.664 *** 0.663 *** 0.665 *** 0.664 ***
0.1372 0.1371 0.138 0.135
Constant -50.157 ** -48.13 ** -34.2 ** 25.157 **
17.243 14.243 17.3 11.243
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Database FE yes yes yes yes
Nb of observations 8888 8888 8888 8888
Log pseudolikelihood -4.65E+10 -4.43E+10 -4.87E+10 -4.78E+10
Wald chi2 143552 174552 123852 145352
Pseudo R2 0.914 0.913 0.915 0.914
* Signi￿cant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Robust standard errors below the estimates
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between remittances and migrants￿education
both theoretically and empirically, using original bilateral remittances data. This is
an important policy issue given the increasing reliance on remittances of many devel-
oping countries and the concomitant rise in migrants￿skill levels due to supply-side
(e.g., self-selection) and demand-side (generalization of quality-selective immigration
policies of the point-system type) forces. Previous literature has been either incon-
clusive or produced con￿ icting results as to whether the highly educated temd to
people among the selected immigrants; for example, in 1997, 50,000 professional specialists and
entrepreneurs immigrated in Canada with 75,000 additional family members, representing 58% of
total immigration.
27remit more or less. While macro studies using aggregate data found a negative e⁄ect
of migrants education on total remittances, studies based on bilateral or micro data
found a generally positive e⁄ect of education on expected remittances (neutral at
the extensive margin, and positive at the intensive margin for the sample combining
eleven household surveys in Bollard et al., 2011).
This paper partly reconciles the results from the existing literature by emphasizing
the role of immigration policies in determining the nature of the relationship between
remittances and migrants￿education. We ￿rst propose a simple model of remittance
behavior interacting migrants￿human capital with two dimensions of immigration
policies: restrictiveness, and selectivity. The model predicts that the relationship be-
tween remittances and migrants￿education will be inverse-U shaped and that for a
given country pair, a more skilled pool of migrants will send more (resp. less) remit-
tances if the destination country has a more restrictive (resp. selective) immigration
policy. Using a new database obtained by merging various second-hand sources on
bilateral remittances for a large set of country-pairs over the period 1985-2005, we
test these predictions by interacting in our remittance regressions the skill compo-
sition of immigration with proxy measures for the restrictiveness and selectivity of
immigration policies at destination. The results strongly support the theoretical
analysis, suggesting that immigration policies in the migrants￿host countries deter-
mine whether the home countries receive relatively more or less remittances from
their skilled emigrants.
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